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Abstract
■ Judgments of agency refer to peopleʼs self-reflective assess-
ments concerning their own control: their assessments of the
extent to which they themselves are responsible for an action.
These self-reflective metacognitive judgments can be distin-
guished from action monitoring, which involves the detection
of the divergence (or lack of divergence) between observed
states and expected states. Presumably, people form judgments
of agency by metacognitively reflecting on the output of their
action monitoring and then consciously inferring the extent to
which they caused the action in question. Although a number
of previous imaging studies have been directed at action mon-
itoring, none have assessed judgments of agency as a poten-
tially separate process. The present fMRI study used an
agency paradigm that not only allowed us to examine the brain
activity associated with action monitoring but that also enabled
us to investigate those regions associated with metacognition of
agency. Regarding action monitoring, we found that being “out
of control” during the task (i.e., detection of a discrepancy be-
tween observed and expected states) was associated with in-
creased brain activity in the right TPJ, whereas being “in
control” was associated with increased activity in the pre-SMA,
rostral cingulate zone, and dorsal striatum (regions linked to
self-initiated action). In contrast, when participants made self-
reflective metacognitive judgments about the extent of their
own control (i.e., judgments of agency) compared with when
they made judgments that were not about control (i.e., judg-
ments of performance), increased activity was observed in the
anterior PFC, a region associated with self-reflective processing.
These results indicate that action monitoring is dissociable from
peopleʼs conscious self-attributions of control. ■
INTRODUCTION
The present study examines the neurocognitive basis of
action monitoring and metacognitive judgments of
agency. Action monitoring involves the ability to detect
whether action outcomes are in line with the expected
consequences of our intended actions (i.e., with our ac-
tion plans). It plays an important role in the way we co-
ordinate our movements with objects and events in the
environment, including other agents. Although action
monitoring is a critical component of voluntary action,
empirical evidence suggests that it may (at least part of
the time) operate at a spontaneous or automatic level
of processing. For example, a number of studies have dem-
onstrated that we can respond to minor violations of our
action plans (such as unpredicted jumps in target position)
at both a neural and behavioral level without awareness of
having done so (e.g., Pisella et al., 2000). Thus, it appears
that we can (and sometimes do) use the output of our
monitoring to successfully coordinate our actions without
first consciously interpreting whether this output indicates
the presence or absence of control. In contrast, to make an
explicit judgment concerning our own agency, we do need
to consciously assess whether or not we were in control.
For instance, to determine our responsibility for a par-
ticular action, we must be able to metacognitively reflect
on the output of our action monitoring, as well as other
relevant cues, and then consciously infer the extent to
which we were or were not the cause of the action in
question (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau,
& Newen, 2008; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004;
Wegner, 2002, 2003). Therefore, when it comes to under-
standing human agency, the question is not simply how we
monitor disturbances in the execution of our actions but
also how we use the output of this monitoring to make
metacognitive judgments about whether or not we were
in control.
Althoughwe aswell as others (Pacherie, in press; Haggard
& Tsakiris, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2008; Metcalfe & Greene,
2007; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) have proposed that
there may be a distinction between action monitoring
and metacognition of agency, brain imaging studies have
focused exclusively on identifying patterns of neural activity
that are associated with action monitoring (see David,
Newen, & Vogeley, 2008, for a review). Typically, the par-
ticipants in these studies attempted to perform a specific
action or behavior and then received sensory feedback
concerning the spatial trajectory or temporal sequence of
their movement that either coincides or conflicts with their
action plan. When the feedback was discrepant with ex-
pectations, the imaging results have consistently shown
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(rTPJ; e.g., Nahab et al., 2011; Spengler, von Cramon, &
Brass, 2009; Farrer et al., 2003; Leube et al., 2003). The
TPJ is a region with boundaries that cannot be structurally
defined and is often described as encompassing the supra-
marginal gyrus, the inferior parietal lobe/angular gyrus, cau-
dal parts of the superior temporal gyrus, dorsal–rostral
parts of the occipital gyri, and posterior parts of the STS
(Decety & Lamm, 2007). We later report the results of a
meta-analysis of recent agency studies that we conducted
to define this broad ROI for the present study.
The fact that increases in TPJ activation are reliably asso-
ciated with decreases in control has led many researchers
to speculate that the TPJ receives input from a comparator
mechanism that is responsible for determining whether
the predicted consequences of an intended action (on
the basis of the output of an internal “forward model”)
match sensory feedback about the actual trajectory of the
action (Hohwy & Frith, 2004; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith,
2002; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; cf. Synofzik et al.,
2008). When the predicted and actual trajectory do not
match, the TPJ is thought to receive a signal indicating that
a mismatch exists and that corrective action may be re-
quired. On a somewhat less consistent basis, the results
of previous action monitoring studies have sometimes
shown increased activation in the cerebellum (Blakemore,
Frith, &Wolpert, 2001), precuneus (David et al., 2007), and
extrastriate body area (David et al., 2007) in response to a
mismatch, and in the insula (Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard,
2010; Farrer et al., 2003) and pre-SMA (Tsakiris et al.,
2010) when actions proceed as planned.
Although participants in some of the studies on action
monitoring provided judgments of agency after they com-
pleted the focal task (e.g., Nahab et al., 2011; Spengler
et al., 2009; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004), these judg-
ments were used only to identify neural activity during
the task that was related to feeling in or out of control. Im-
aging data corresponding to the judgments themselves,
though, were either not collected or not analyzed. Thus,
as of yet, no studies have been published that examine
the neural activity associated with metacognition of
agency itself—that is, with reflecting on the output
of oneʼs action monitoring after an action has been
performed.
In the present experiment, each trial consisted of both
a game phase, in which participantsʼ task was to move
the cursor (via the trackball) along a horizontal track to
touch each of the downward scrolling Xs, and a judgment
phase, in which they judged either how much “in con-
trol” they felt during the game or how well they had per-
formed (see Figure 1). In a manipulation somewhat
similar to those used in previous action-monitoring
studies (Farrer et al., 2003; Franck et al., 2001; Blakemore,
Frith, & Wolpert, 1999), in which the trajectory of the
personʼs apparent movement was altered, we disrupted
participantsʼ objective control by adding random noise
or “turbulence” to the position of the cursor. Alterna-
tively, we sometimes distorted control by having the Xs
disappear “by magic” (i.e., without the cursor having actu-
ally touched the X). Our behavioral question was whether
participantsʼ judgments of agency would be sensitive to
these disruptions of control. Our imaging question was
whether similar patterns of brain activation would be ob-
served during the game and judgment phases of the task
or whether action monitoring and judgments of agency
involve different sets of neural processes.
Because our previous research using a similar para-
digm has shown that the judgments of agency made by
college students, older adults, and even (to some extent)
children tend to accurately reflect these manipulated
disruptions of control (Metcalfe, Eich, & Castel, 2010;
Kirkpatrick, Metcalfe, Greene, & Hart, 2008; Metcalfe &
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of trials from the experiment.
Participants viewed a fixation cross for 2 sec, played the game for
15 sec (during which they were exposed to the turbulence and
magic manipulations), and then took as long as they needed to
make either a judgment of agency or a judgment of performance
(depending on the run). The turbulence manipulation involved
adding pseudorandom noise to the spatial correspondence between
the mouse and the cursor; the magic manipulation involved causing
the Xs to disappear and the corresponding ping noise to sound
whenever the cursor was moved within 10 pixels of the outer edge
of a target (such that participants often received credit for Xs
without actually touching them).
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Greene, 2007), we hypothesized that when participants
experienced such disruptions during the game phase of
the present experiment, they would exhibit increased
neural activity in regions that are associated with action
monitoring, particularly the rTPJ. In contrast, we hypothe-
sized that when they reflected back on this disruption (i.e.,
when they made their agency judgments) compared with
when they reflected back on their performance, there
would be increased activation in areas that subserve key
processes involved in metacognition of agency, such as
self-reflection and self-attribution.
Perhaps the most extensive line of research on self-
reflection has focused on identifying brain regions that
underlie the evaluation of oneʼs own traits, abilities, and
mental states (for reviews, see van der Meer, Costafreda,
Aleman, & David, 2010; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007; Northoff
et al., 2006). In these studies, participants are typically pre-
sented with trait or mental state adjectives and are asked
to indicate whether the adjectives apply to them (self-
attribution condition) or whether they apply to another
individual, such as a friend, relative, or celebrity (other-
attribution condition). Results have consistently shown
stronger activation of cortical midline structures and their
surrounding regions, including the middle and medial
anterior PFC (aPFC; i.e., BA 10) during self-attribution trials
compared with other-attribution trials (e.g., Jenkins &
Mitchell, 2011; see also Vinogradov et al., 2006). A closely
related line of research has shown increased activity in the
aPFC when people reflect on their own feelings or inten-
tions while forming judgments or making decisions (for
reviews, see Mitchell, 2009; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Ramnani
& Owen, 2004; Christoff & Gabrielli, 2000). Given the con-
vergence of these findings, a number of investigators have
theorized that the processing of self-relevant information
(i.e., information about oneʼs attributes, experiences, and
mental states) emerges from cortical midline structures,
including regions of the aPFC, that are tightly intercon-
nected and functionally distinct from structures that under-
lie domain-general cognitive processing (van der Meer
et al., 2010; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007; Northoff et al.,
2006). In the present experiment then, it was our hypoth-
esis that these structures, rather than the structures asso-
ciated with action monitoring, would be particularly active
when people made metacognitive judgments of agency
compared with judgments of performance.
METHODS
Participants
The participants were 11 members of the Columbia com-
munity (7 women, 1 left-handed, mean age = 27 years,
range = 18–36 years) who provided consent in a manner
approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review
Board and were treated in accordance with APA ethical
guidelines. An outlier analysis determined that the left-
handed participantʼs data did not differ significantly from
the rest of the sample, and so they were included in all
analyses.
Behavioral Procedure
The primary task, which was framed as a computer game,
involved using a trackball to move a cursor left and right
along a horizontal track at the bottom of the screen as ap-
proximately 20–30 stimuli (Xs andOs) that were randomly
distributed from left to right scrolled down from the top of
the screen to the bottom (see Metcalfe et al., 2010;
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). During each trial of the task,
the Xs or Os disappeared as soon as they were “touched”
by the cursor but continued to scroll past the horizontal
track if they were not touched. In addition, a “ping” sound
occurred each time an X was hit and a “pong” sound
occurred each time an O was hit (see Figure 1).
Before entering the scanner, participants were in-
structed to use the track ball to touch as many Xs with
the cursor as possible and to avoiding touching any of
the Os. They were also told that, after completing each
trial, they would be asked to make either a judgment of
agency or a judgment of performance. For judgments of
agency, participants were presented with a visual ana-
logue scale and instructed to pull the slider to the left
if they felt they were “not in control” or to the right if
they felt they were “in control.” For judgments of perfor-
mance, participants were presented with the same scale
but were instructed to pull the slider to the left if they felt
that their performance was “very low” or to the right if
they felt their performance was “very high.” For both
types of judgment, the left end of the scale was coded
0 and the right end was coded 100, with values in be-
tween being assigned a value based on the proportion
of the distance between the two ends that was spanned
by the slider.
Once in the scanner, each experimental session con-
sisted of four to six runs (depending on the amount of
scanner time available for that participant after instructions
and structural scans had been completed), with each run
consisting of a single set of 24 trials, for a total of 96–
144 trials per participant. All trials consisted of two phases,
a game phase that lasted 15 sec and a judgment phase that
lasted from the end of the game phase (at which point the
visual analogue scale immediately appeared) until the
participant made an agency or performance rating and
clicked the “OK” button (see Figure 1). The intertrial inter-
val (during which a fixation cross appeared on the screen)
was set to 2 sec. Within each run, we manipulated two fac-
tors (termed “turbulence” and “magic”), such that the
game phase of each trial belonged to one of four condi-
tions: a Control condition in which the participants experi-
enced a direct temporal and spatial correspondence
between their movement of the mouse and the movement
of the cursor on the screen, a Turbulence condition in
which pseudorandom noise was added to the spatial corre-
spondence between the mouse and the cursor, a Magic
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condition in which Xs disappeared and the corresponding
ping noise sounded whenever the cursor was moved
within 10 pixels of the outer edge of a target (such that par-
ticipants often received credit for Xs without actually
touching them), and a combined TurbMagic condition in
which both manipulations occurred together. The pseudo-
random noise in the Turbulence and TurbMagic conditions
was generated each time the computer program updated
the gameʼs graphical display (every 33–83 msec) and was
based on the following formula Δxʼ = Δx + [6 × sin(2tπ/
45) + r], wherein Δx was the distance the participant actu-
ally moved the mouse, t was the number of updates that
had been computed since the counter was last reset (the
counter was always reset after 45 updates), r was a random
integer between−4 and 4, and Δxʼ was the resultant move-
ment on the computer screen. The order of the 24 trials in
each run was pseudorandom.
Across runs, we manipulated a single factor ( judgment
type), such that participants made only judgments of
agency for all of the trials in half of the runs and made
judgments of performance for all of the trials in the other
half of the runs. Judgment type alternated from one run
to the next, with the judgment type of the first run
counterbalanced across participants. The purpose of
manipulating judgment type across runs, as opposed to
having participants make both types of judgment for
each trial or on consecutive trials, was to avoid carryover
effects. In addition to recording participantsʼ judgments,
the program recorded the number of Xs and Os partici-
pants touched during the game phase of each trial, the
number of Xs and Os that appeared on the screen but




Trial-by-trial hit rates (i.e., percentage of Xs touched),
false alarm rates (i.e., percentage of Os touched), and dʼ
values were computed for each participant. Because anal-
yses of these performance variables yielded similar pat-
terns of results, only the analysis of hit rate (which was
the primary measure of performance in previous studies;
e.g., Metcalfe et al., 2010; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) is re-
ported. To determine the effectiveness of the turbulence
and magic manipulations, we submitted hit rate to a 2
(Turbulence: turbulence vs. no turbulence) × 2 (Magic:
magic vs. no magic) repeated measures ANOVA.
Judgments
Because there tends to be a strong correlation between par-
ticipantsʼ judgments of agency and their hit rate (Metcalfe
et al., 2010; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), the primary ques-
tion of interest was whether or not participants correctly
inferred their lack of agency in conditions under which
they were not fully in control (i.e., the Turbulence, Magic,
and TurbMagic conditions), regardless of how well they
thought they had performed in these conditions. That is,
when controlling for differences in perceived performance
across trials, do we still find effects of the Turbulence and
Magic manipulations on judgments of agency? Affirmative
answers would suggest that any brain activity resulting from
these manipulations was related to the feeling of agency
itself. To address the question, we conducted several differ-
ent analyses.
First, in keeping with our past experiments using this
paradigm, we computed summary scores for each partic-
ipant based on the following formula, ( JOPC − JOAC) −
( JOPE − JOAE), where JOP refers to the mean judgment
of performance, JOA refers to the mean judgment of
agency, the subscript C refers to the Control condition,
and the subscript E refers to the particular experimental
condition of interest (i.e., Turbulence, Magic, or TurbMagic).
These summary scores, which compress the interactions
between judgments of agency and judgments of perfor-
mance into a single measure (see Metcalfe et al., 2010),
should have been negative, so long as participants realized
that their performance in the experimental conditions
(where agency was objectively decreased) was not entirely
because of their own actions. Second, to take advantage of
the factorial design used in the present study (and to be
consistent with the contrast analyses of the imaging data
reported below), we also computed another set of sum-
mary scores based on the main effects of the two manipu-
lations. The formula used for these scores was ( JOPA −
JOAA) − ( JOPP − JOAP), where the subscript A refers to
the absence of the particular experimental manipulation
of interest (e.g., the average of the Control and Magic con-
ditions when looking at Turbulence) and the subscript P
refers to the presence of the manipulation (e.g., the aver-
age of the Turbulence and TurbMagic conditions when
looking at Turbulence).
Finally, to analyze the behavioral results in a manner
that is more consistent with our parametric analysis of
the imaging data reported below, we submitted each par-
ticipantʼs judgments of agency to a separate regression
test in which hit rate (which served as a proxy for per-
ceived performance), turbulence (dummy-coded: 0 = no
turbulence, 1 = turbulence), and magic (dummy-coded:
0 = no magic, 1 = magic) served as simultaneous predic-
tors. We then performed a series of one-sample t tests to
determine whether the mean beta coefficients for the
group differed significantly from zero (Lorch & Myers,
1990). Next, to determine whether the manipulations
uniquely targeted participantsʼ metacognition of agency
or whether they had similar effects on participantsʼ per-
ceived performance, we repeated the previously described
regression analyses and t tests with judgments of per-
formance as the dependent variable. We completed the
analysis by directly comparing the beta coefficients asso-
ciated with the two types of judgments in a series of
paired-samples t tests.
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fMRI Data Acquisition
Images were acquired with a GE twin-speed 1.5-T scan-
ner. Whole-brain functional data were acquired in 27 con-
tiguous axial slices (4.0-mm thick, 3 × 3 mm in-plane
resolution) parallel to the anterior–posterior commissure
line with a T2*-weighted EPI sequence (TR=2000, TE= 38,
flip angle = 90°, field of view = 192, array size = 64 × 64).
Each run acquired 275 whole-brain volumes, the first five
of which were discarded to allow the scanner to stabilize.
Structural data were acquired with a high-resolution T1-
weighted spoiled gradient-echo scan, which recorded 182
slices at a thickness of 1 mm and a resolution of 1 × 1 mm.
fMRI Data Analysis
Preprocessing
Spatial preprocessing and statistical analyses were per-
formed with SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuro-
imaging, University College London, London, UK). First,
each functional brain volume was corrected for differ-
ences in acquisition time between slices and realigned
to correct for head movement. The data were then normal-
ized to a standard anatomical space using the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template, resampled into
2-mm isotropic voxels, and spatially smoothed with an
8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Primary Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed to test two separate
models using the general linear model framework imple-
mented in SPM5 (Friston et al., 1995). In both cases, a
high-pass filter (128 sec) was applied to the data to remove
low-frequency drifts in signal changes. The first model (i.e.,
the simple contrast model) was designed to identify brain
regions that responded to disturbances (i.e., Turbulence
and Magic) in agency during the game and judgment
phases, as well as regions that showed increased activation
when making judgments of agency compared with judg-
ments of performance. Thus, eight within-run conditions
(i.e., the four game conditions crossed with the two task
phases) were modeled as boxcar functions (such that each
phase of each trial was treated as a separate epoch) and
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion to create regressors of interest. For each participant,
voxelwise statistical parametric maps were created for the
game and judgment phase contrasts of turbulence versus
no turbulence (Turbulence + TurbMagic vs. Control +
Magic), magic versus no magic (Magic + TurbMagic vs.
Control + Turbulence), and turbulence versus magic (i.e.,
Turbulence + Magic vs. TurbMagic + Control). In addition,
a map was created for the judgment phase contrast of
judgment of agency versus judgment of performance.
Whereas the first three contrasts compared different
regressors collapsing across all runs, the last contrast com-
pared the same judgment phase regressor between two
sets of runs.
The second model (i.e., the parametric model) was
setup to identify brain regions that varied in activation
during the game phase as a function of perceived agency.
Because we were primarily interested in participantsʼ
sense of agency independent of their perceived perfor-
mance on the game (i.e., their sense of being more or
less in control than was indicated by the number of Xs
they managed to touch) and because we did not collect
judgments of performance on the same trials as judg-
ments of agency (as that would have precluded the tem-
poral separation necessary for computing the judgment
of agency vs. judgment of performance contrast de-
scribed above), we operationalized this construct as the
difference between their judgment of agency and hit rate
on each trial of the judgment of agency runs (i.e., judg-
ment of agency [−Xhits/Xtotal × 100]). As a control, we
also computed the difference between participantsʼ judg-
ment of performance and hit rate on each trial of the
judgment of performance runs.
For each set of runs (i.e., the judgment of agency or
judgment of performance runs), the corresponding differ-
ence score for each trial (i.e., judgment of agency [−Xhits/
Xtotal × 100] or judgment of performance [−Xhits/Xtotal ×
100]) was entered into the model as a parametric modu-
lator of both task phases, each of which was modeled as a
boxcar function and convolved with the canonical hemo-
dynamic response function. In addition, because we
wanted to control for potential confounds associated with
performance, such as motor activity and affect (e.g., par-
ticipants may have moved the mouse more or been less
pleased with their performance on the difficult turbulence
trials than on other trials), each difference score was en-
tered into the model after we had included hit rate as a
secondary modulator of the two task phases. That is, be-
cause SPM5ʼs default option is the serial orthogonalization
of parametric modulators, entering hit rate before the dif-
ference score ensured that none of the variance shared by
the two regressors would contaminate activation that is
uniquely associated with the difference score. On the basis
of this model, subject-specific statistical parametric maps
were created for the game phase regressors corresponding
to each difference score. These maps represented the ex-
tent to which changes in the BOLD signal during the game
phase were correlated with participantsʼ subsequent sense
of agency or performance at each voxel in the brain.
To explore each model, single-subject contrast images
from the first level were entered into a second-level random
effects analysis, which involved computing one-sample t tests
across the contrast images of all subjects to create a series
of group level statistical parametric maps (Mumford &
Nichols, 2009). For whole-brain analysis, these maps were
thresholded first at the voxel level ( p< .005, uncorrected)
and then at the cluster level ( p< .05, family-wise error cor-
rected) to protect against false-positive activations (Friston,
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Law, & Paulson, 2006
Asynchronous > Synchronous for
active movements
fMRI −42 −51 45 MNI
−54 −48 27
54 −42 33
Chaminade & Decety, 2002 Following the other > Acting at will
masked exclusively with
Leading the other > Acting at will
PET 44 −58 54 MNI
32 −50 52
David et al., 2006 Passive > Active fMRI −50 −58 16 MNI
58 −38 54
44 −52 54




Imitation of the other by the self >
Self-action
PET −54 −48 24 MNI
54 −52 40
Farrer & Frith, 2002 Other-attribution > Self-attribution fMRI −48 −52 40 MNI
44 −58 32
Farrer et al., 2003 25° deviation > 0° in conjunction with 50° >
25° and Other-controlled > 50°
PET −64 −58 32 MNI
56 −56 36
Farrer et al., 2004 25° deviation > 0° in conjunction with 50° >
25° and Other-controlled >
50° (normal subjects)
PET 56 −56 36 MNI
Farrer et al., 2008
(Study 1)
Awareness of action discrepancy fMRI −40 −58 36 MNI
−48 −38 54
44 −54 38
Farrer et al., 2008
(Study 2)
Perturbed agency fMRI −48 −46 56 MNI
58 −46 48
−40 −58 36
Leube et al., 2003 Correlated with extent of delay fMRI 48 −42 18 MNI










Ruby & Decety, 2001 Third-person simulation >
First-person simulation
PET 44 −64 24 MNI
50 −58 30
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Worsley, Frackowiak, Mazziotta, & Evans, 1993). All signifi-
cant activations were overlaid on sections of the MNI ca-
nonical brain, with peak voxels reported in MNI coordinate
space. For the anatomical labeling of these activations, we
used the automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002).
ROI Analyses
Brain regions that were identified on the basis of theory
and literature review were analyzed using small volume
corrections (SVCs) as implemented in SPM5 (Worsley
et al., 1996). Specifically, when testing for increased acti-
vation in regions of the aPFC during the judgment phase
of the agency task, we restricted the search volume to four
10-mm spheres that were centered at coordinates reported
in a recent meta-analysis of self-reflection studies (van der
Meer et al., 2010). The meta-analysis explored two sets of
contrasts found in fMRI and PET studies of self-reflection:
self-reflection versus baseline contrasts and self-reflection
versus other-reflection contrasts. We based the ROI on
the analysis of the latter set because, as the authors sug-
gest, it identified regions “unique to self-reflective pro-
cessing” as opposed to regions pertaining to “reflective
processing on a broader scale.” The analysis of the 17 stud-
ies that included self-reflection versus other-reflection con-
trasts yielded a large cluster with peaks in the pregenual
part of ACC (pACC; BA 24, 32; 2, 42, 20) and the bilateral
aPFC (0, 50,−2;−2, 54, 8;−18, 50, 16)—the coordinates of
these peaks were used to create the four 10-mm spheres.
When testing for increased activity in the bilateral TPJ
during the game phase of the task, we restricted the
search volume to a 6745-voxel region derived from a
meta-analysis of recent agency studies. The meta-analysis,
which we conducted ourselves, was based on 21 TPJ
coordinates from 10 agency studies originally included
in a meta-analysis by Decety and Lamm (2007),1 as well
as 25 additional coordinates reported in seven recent
agency studies (see Table 1). Analysis of the 46 activation
peaks was conducted in MNI space using multilevel ker-
nel density analysis (Wager, Lindquist, Nichols, Kober, &
Van Snellenberg, 2009). As shown in Figure 3, the resul-
tant activation map, which was thresholded first at the
voxel level ( p < .05) and then at the cluster level ( p <
.05), yielded large clusters in the left (−50,−50, 34; KE =
1738) and right TPJ (54, −50, 32; KE = 5007) that in-
cluded portions of the angular gyus, supramarginal gyrus,
inferior parietal lobule, superior temporal gyrus, and mid-
dle temporal gyrus. Multilevel kernel density analysis was
used because it designates contrast maps (and not peaks)
as the unit of analysis. This means that contrast maps are
essentially treated as random effects, which ensures that
no one contrast map can contribute disproportionately to
the overall results, even if it contains numerous peaks in
the same area. Unless otherwise indicated, all maps ana-
lyzed using SVCs were thresholded at a voxel level of p <





The results of the hit rate analysis revealed a significant
main effect of Turbulence (F(1, 10) = 57.35, p < .001,








Schnell et al., 2007 Monitoring condition >
Control condition




Spengler et al., 2009 Correlated with increased discrepancy fMRI −49 −56 15 TAL
54 −52 20
Tsakiris et al., 2010 Main effect of asynchronous stimulation fMRI 40 −58 26 MNI
52 −38 38
Williams et al., 2006 Imitation > Action execution fMRI 59 −26 27 MNI
55 −33 38
Yomogida et al., 2010 Agency error fMRI 55 −33 38 MNI
Talairach coordinates were converted to MNI space using tal2icbm_spm.m as implemented in GingerALE v2.0.
The current meta-analysis was based on a previous meta-analysis of agency studies conducted by Decety and Lamm (2007). However, we excluded five
studies (Kable & Chatterjee, 2006; Ramnani & Miall, 2004; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004; Fink et al., 1999; Spence et al., 1997) from the
Decety and Lamm meta-analysis because the contrasts for which they reported increased TPJ activity did not fit with our definition of agency.
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MSe= 707.42, ηp
2 = .85), such that participants were less
accurate when turbulence was present (M = 64.40, SE =
1.66) than when it was absent (M = 72.42, SE = 1.61), as
well as a significant main effect of Magic (F(1, 10) =
1,146.72, p < .001, MSe = 12,087.35, ηp
2 = .99), such
that participants were more accurate when magic was
present (M = 84.99, SE = 1.76) than when it was absent
(M= 51.84, SE= 1.47). These main effects were qualified
by a significant interaction (F(1, 10) = 148.80, p < .001,
MSe = 543.84, ηp
2 = .94). Bonferroni tests revealed that,
although turbulence lowered the mean hit rate when
magic was absent (t(10) = 11.42, p< .001), it had no effect
on hit rate when magic was present (t(10) = .91, p = .38).
It should also be noted that, across all conditions, there
were strong within-participants correlations between hit
rate and judgments of performance (rmean= .71), an impor-
tant finding given that we used hit rate as a proxy for judg-
ments of performance in some of the imaging analyses.
Judgments
As shown in the left panel of Figure 2, the results of the first
analysis replicated the findings from our previous agency
studies. More specifically, the summary agency scores for
the Turbulence (X
_
= −27.21, t(10) = 4.68, p < .001),
Magic (X
_
=−13.35, t(10)= 3.79, p= .004), and TurbMagic
conditions (X
_
= −37.45, t(10) = 5.78, p < .001) were sig-
nificantly less than zero, indicating that in all three in-
stances people correctly recognized that they were not
completely in control. Follow-up tests revealed that,
although this effect was stronger in the Turbulence condi-
tion than in the Magic condition (t(10) = 2.81, p = .02), it
was strongest when both manipulations were present in
the same trial (i.e., in the TurbMagic condition; ts > 4.12,
ps < .003). The results of the second analysis showed vir-
tually the same pattern, as depicted in the right panel of
Figure 2. The summary agency scores for the main effects
of the Turbulence (X
_
= −25.65, t(10) = 4.74, p < .001)
and Magic manipulations (X
_
= −11.80, t(10) = 6.05, p <
.001) were both significantly less than zero, and this effect
was again stronger for turbulence than for magic (t(10) =
2.81, p = .02).
For the final analysis, within-subject regression tests re-
vealed significant effects of hit rate (βmean= .34, t(10)=9.03,
p< .001) and turbulence (βmean =−.66, t(10) =−12.34,
p < .001) on participantsʼ judgments of agency, but no
effect of magic (βmean = −.05, t(10) = −.83, p = .43).
Thus, consistent with the results of first two analyses,
decreases in control because of turbulence (though not
magic in this case) led to decreases in participantsʼ judg-
ments of agency, even when controlling for task perfor-
mance. Additional regression analyses revealed significant
effects of hit rate (βmean = .64, t(10) = 10.69, p< .001) and
turbulence (βmean = −.17, t(10) = −4.11, p = .002), but
no effect of magic (βmean = .03, t(10) = .43, p = .78) on
participantsʼ judgments of performance. However, a com-
parison of beta coefficients between the two types of judg-
ments showed that turbulence had a significantly stronger
negative effect on judgments of agency compared with
judgments of performance (t(10) = −9.28, p < .001),
whereas hit rate had a significantly weaker positive effect
(t(10) = −8.40, p < .001). Once again, these results indi-
cate that themain outcome of the turbulencemanipulation
was a reduction in participantsʼ sense of control.
fMRI Results
Simple Contrast Model
Turbulence contrasts. To determine whether the tur-
bulence manipulation increased activity in the brain region
that is most directly associated with detecting disruptions
of control, we examined neural responses in the TPJ ROI
Figure 2. (Left) Participantsʼ
summary agency scores based
on the formula ( JOPC− JOAC)−
( JOPE − JOAE), wherein JOP
refers to mean judgment of
performance, JOA refers to
mean judgment of agency, the
subscript C refers to the control
condition, and the subscript E
refers to the particular
experimental condition of
interest (i.e., Turbulence, Magic,
or TurbMagic). (Right) Agency
scores based on the formula
( JOPA − JOAA) − ( JOPP −
JOAP), wherein the subscript A
refers to the absence of the
particular experimental
manipulation of interest (e.g.,
the average of the Control and
Magic conditions, when looking at Turbulence) and the subscript P refers to the presence of the manipulation (e.g., the average of the Turbulence and
TurbMagic conditions, when looking at Turbulence). In both cases, a negative score indicates that participants correctly perceived themselves not to be in
full control of the cursor. Error bars reflect SEMs.
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during the game phase of the task for turbulence trials
(Turbulence + TurbMagic) compared with no turbulence
trials (Control + Magic). As shown in Figure 3, the results
of the analysis yielded a large cluster of activity in the right
TPJ (56, −34, 26; Z = 4.90; KE = 618; p < .05, cluster cor-
rected) as well as a smaller cluster in the right TPJ (48,
−62, 4; Z = 3.96; KE = 72; p < .05, false discovery rate
[FDR] corrected) and two smaller clusters in the left TPJ
(−44,−64, 12; Z= 3.37; KE = 65; p< .05, FDR corrected;
−50, −40, 24; Z = 3.48; KE = 21; p < .05, FDR corrected)
that did not meet the primary threshold. To explore the
pattern of this activity across all four game conditions, we
used MarsBar v0.42 software (marsbar.sourceforge.net) to
extract percent signal change for each participant from
the portion of the large right-sided cluster that overlapped
with the TPJ ROI. As depicted in the bottom right inset
of Figure 3, there was significantly more activity in the
Turbulence condition than in the Magic or Control con-
ditions (ts > 4.46, ps < .002); furthermore, these effects
were not qualified by a significant Turbulence × Magic
interaction (F(1, 10) = .11, p = .75, MSe < .001, ηp
2 =
.01). Thus, it appears that (independent of any effects of
Magic) our turbulence manipulation had a similar effect
on participantsʼ neural activity as the manipulations of
perceived control used in previous studies of agency.
The corresponding whole-brain analysis revealed that
much of the activity within the TPJ ROI belonged to a sig-
nificant cluster of right-sided activation that included re-
gions of the supramarginal gyrus, the posterior superior
temporal gyrus/STS, and the rolandic operculum (see Ta-
ble 2). The analysis also revealed a similar but smaller
cluster of activation on the left side as well as clusters
in the bilateral posterior middle temporal gyrus, the left
postcentral gyrus, and the right precentral gyrus. The
Figure 3. The resultant
activation maps from our
meta-analysis of recent agency
studies (in blue) and from the
game phase turbulence >
no turbulence contrast
(in yellow). An SVC analysis
revealed clusters of overlapping
activity in both the right (56,
−34, 26; Z = 4.90; KE = 618;
p < .05, cluster corrected; 48,
−62, 4; Z = 3.96; KE = 72;
p < .05, FDR corrected) and
left TPJ (−44, −64, 12; Z =
3.37; KE = 65; p < .05, FDR
corrected; −50, −40, 24; Z =
3.48; KE = 21; p < .05, FDR
corrected). The bottom right
graph shows parameter
estimates for the large cluster
in the rTPJ that met our
primary threshold. Percent
signal change was computed
for individual participants
using MarsBaR v0.42 (marsbar.
sourceforge.net). Error bars
reflect SEMs.
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reverse contrast (i.e., no turbulence > turbulence trials)
did not reveal any suprathreshold brain regions during
the game phase.
During the judgment phase, the turbulence > no tur-
bulence contrast did not reveal any suprathreshold brain
regions. However, the reverse contrast revealed a large
cluster of right-sided activity that extended across regions
of the lingual gyrus, calcarine sulcus, and cuneus, as well
as a smaller cluster that included regions of the right
frontal operculum and precentral gyrus.
Magic contrasts. To determine whether the magic ma-
nipulation also increased activity in the TPJ, we examined
neural responses in the TPJ ROI during the game phase
of the task for magic trials (Magic + TurbMagic) com-
pared with no magic trials (Control + Turbulence). The
results revealed several small clusters of activation in the
left and right TPJ; however, these clusters did not survive
correction. The corresponding whole-brain analysis
showed increased activation in the bilateral putamen/
piriform cortex and the right precuneus. The reverse
Table 2. Suprathreshold Clusters for the Turbulence Manipulation
Side Anatomical Region of Cluster Cluster Size Cluster Maxima (MNI) Z Score
Game Phase: Turbulence (Turbulence + TurbMagic) > No Turbulence (Control + Magic)
R TPJ (supramarginal gyrus, posterior
superior temporal gyrus/sulcus,
rolandic operculum)
1386 56 −34 26 4.90
68 −34 18 4.54
58 −34 14 4.51
R Posterior middle temporal gyrus 356 48 −62 4 3.96
R Precentral gyrus, SMA 541 26 −16 68 3.78
14 −28 66 3.75
12 −8 68 3.54
L TPJ (posterior superior temportal gyrus) 359 −48 −34 18 4.42
−40 −48 24 2.54
L Posterior middle temporal gyrus 409 −46 −66 8 3.85
−46 −56 10 3.21
−60 −64 6 2.80
L Postcentral gyrus, superior parietal lobule 637 −16 −38 70 3.75
−34 −42 70 3.35
−28 −58 64 3.19
Game Phase: No Turbulence (Control + Magic) >
Turbulence (Turbulence + TurbMagic): ns
Judgment Phase: Turbulence (Turbulence + TurbMagic) >
No Turbulence (Control + Magic): ns
Judgment Phase: No Turbulence (Control + Magic) >
Turbulence (Turbulence + TurbMagic):
R Lingual gyrus, calcarine sulcus, cuneus 2117 18 −86 6 4.59
12 −78 2 4.29
14 −78 20 4.10
R Frontal operculum, precentral gyrus 358 44 12 38 4.10
40 14 22 3.20
32 18 20 3.11
R = right; L = left.
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contrast (i.e., performance during the no magic>magic
trials), did not reveal any suprathreshold brain regions.
For the judgments phase of the task, the magic > no
magic contrast revealed a significant cluster of activation
in the right lateral PFC. The reverse contrast did not
reveal any suprathreshold brain regions. The weak effects
of Magic, relative to Turbulence, may correspond to the
relatively weak behavioral effects that we observed for
this variable (see above).
Turbulence × Magic contrasts. To determine whether
there were any regions of the TPJ that responded more
strongly to the combined effects of Turbulence and Magic
than to either manipulation alone, we examined neural re-
sponses in the TPJ ROI during the game phase of the task
for the TurbMagic and Control trials compared with the
Turbulence and Magic trials. The results of this analysis
and of the corresponding whole-brain analysis did not
reveal any significant clusters. The reverse contrast (which
would indicate regions that exhibited interference between
the manipulations) revealed several minute clusters of
activation in the right TPJ; however, these clusters did
not survive correction. In addition, the corresponding
whole-brain analysis did not reveal any suprathreshold
brain regions. For the judgments phase of the task, neither
of the two interaction contrasts revealed significant clusters
of activation.
Judgment of agency versus judgment of performance
contrasts. To determine whether there was increased
activity in brain regions associated with self-reflection
when participants made judgments of agency compared
with when they made judgments of performance, we ex-
amined neural responses in the aPFC ROI during the
judgment phase of the task for judgment of agency trials
compared with judgment of performance trials. The re-
sults of the analysis revealed a significant area of activa-
tion (−20, 50, 20; Z = 3.09; KE = 100; p < .05, cluster
corrected) that was part of a larger cluster (KE = 261)
in the left aPFC (see Figure 4). In addition, a cluster
was found in the right OFC (i.e., BA 11) slightly outside
the aPFC ROI (18, 46, −12; KE = 97; p < .0001, uncor-
rected). These activations suggest that judgments of
agency may involve a greater degree of self-referential
thought than typical metacognitive judgments. The
whole-brain analyses for the contrasts of judgment of
agency > judgment of performance and judgment of
performance > judgment of agency did not reveal any
suprathreshold brain regions.
Parametric Model
Regions during the game phase that were negatively cor-
related with sense of agency. The analysis examining
the particular brain regions whose activity during the
game phase was negatively correlated with participantsʼ
reported sense of agency (i.e., judgments of agency
minus hit rate) while controlling for actual performance
did not yield any suprathreshold clusters of activation.
However, small clusters of activity were found in the right
(62, −36, 18; KE = 26; p < .005, uncorrected) and left
sides (−50, −40, 24; KE = 12; p < .005, uncorrected)
of the TPJ ROI. In addition, a conjunction between the
uncorrected map from the whole-brain analysis ( p <
.005) and the results of the turbulence > no turbulence
contrast revealed that these clusters were part of com-
mon activity in the right (64, −36, 16; KE = 52; p <
.005, uncorrected) and left TPJ (−46, −38, 18; KE = 85;
p < .005, uncorrected). Thus, in accordance with pre-
vious findings, it appears that activity in the TPJ is asso-
ciated with disruptions of control.
As a control, a similar analysis of the regions that were
negatively correlated with the difference between partici-
pantsʼ judgments of performance and their hit rate
yielded a significant cluster in the medial precuneus/
posterior cingulate cortex. And although a small cluster
of activity in the TPJ ROI was also found (62, −20, 30,
KE = 41; p < .005, uncorrected), a conjunction with
the turbulence > no turbulence contrast showed that
this cluster was not part of common activity in the TPJ
(the conjunction did, however, show a small cluster of
Figure 4. Cluster of activation
during the judgment phase
of the task that overlapped
with the aPFC ROI when
participants made judgments
of agency, relative to when
they made judgments of
performance (−20, 50, 20,
Z = 3.09; KE = 100; p < .05,
cluster corrected across the
small volume). Percent signal
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common activity in a neighboring region; 64, −36, 12;
KE = 21; p < .005, uncorrected).
Regions during the game phase that were positively
correlated with sense of agency. The analysis examining
the particular brain regions whose activity during the game
phase was positively correlated with participantsʼ reported
sense of agency while controlling for actual performance
yielded significant clusters of activation in the right putamen/
thalamus, bilateral rostral cingulate zone/pre-SMA, right
pre/postcentral gyrus, and right calcarine/precuneus (see
Figure 5 and Table 3). A similar analysis of the regions that
were positively correlated with the difference between
judgments of performance and hit rate (which again served
as a control) did not yield any suprathreshold clusters.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we dissociated the neural correlates
of two distinct components of peopleʼs sense of agency:
the action monitoring that people engage in as they per-
form an action and the metacognitive judgments of
agency that they make when retrospectively assessing
the extent of their control. These results are consistent
with a model of agency (Metcalfe et al., 2010; Haggard
& Tsakiris, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2008; Metcalfe & Greene,
2007; Wegner et al., 2004; Wegner, 2002, 2003; Georgieff
& Jeannerod, 1998) that says that people form their
metacognitive judgments of agency by reflecting on the
output of their action monitoring, as well as other rele-
vant cues, and then consciously inferring the extent to
which they caused the action outcomes in question. Pre-
vious studies, like the present study, used judgments of
agency to identify neural activity that is associated with
action monitoring; however, unlike the present study,
they did not attempted to determine whether there are
specific patterns of neural activity associated with the
judgments of agency themselves. The present study
addressed this gap in the literature by using an agency
paradigm that not only allowed us to examine the neural
Figure 5. Clusters of activation
during the game phase of the
task that were positively
correlated with participantsʼ
reported sense of agency.
See Table 3 for a list of
activation peaks.
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activity associated with the presence or absence of dis-
ruptions of control during the performance of a motor
task but that also enabled us to determine which brain
regions were active after the motor task had been com-
pleted and participants reflected back on how much con-
trol they had had.
Disruptions of Control
The results of both the simple contrast and parametric
analyses showed increased activity in bilateral regions
of the TPJ when the consequences of participantsʼ ac-
tions were not in line with what they intended or ex-
pected them to be (e.g., when turbulence caused the
cursor to move to the left after a participant moved the
mouse to the right). An ROI analysis showed that these
regions overlapped with brain areas identified in a meta-
analysis of similar contrasts from previous agency studies,
as shown in Figure 3.
One explanation for the role of the TPJ in agency pro-
cessing comes from the comparator model of action
monitoring, which proposes a mechanism by which the
predicted consequences of an intended action are com-
pared with sensory feedback about the actual conse-
quences of the action (Hohwy & Frith, 2004; Blakemore
et al., 2002; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; cf. Synofzik
et al., 2008). When the predicted and actual consequences
do not match, the comparator sends a signal to the control
mechanism responsible for executing motor corrections
indicating that there has been a disruption of control.
Because activity in the TPJ and its surrounding areas tends
to be associated with disruptions of control, it is possible
that this region is responsible for either monitoring the
comparator signal or for executing corresponding motor
corrections. Research on motor planning in monkeys
(e.g., Mulliken, Musallam, & Andersen, 2008) indicates that
the posterior parietal cortex (which is adjacent to the TPJ)
uses multisensory input (including visual, auditory, and
vestibular information) and efference copies of motor com-
mands to predict the outcomes of self-initiated actions
(e.g., the movement of a limb or the expected position of
a cursor). Furthermore, TMS and lesion studies in humans
(e.g., MacDonald & Paus, 2003) demonstrate that the
Table 3. Suprathreshold Clusters for the Parametric Analyses of Game Phase Activity
Side Anatomical Region of Cluster Cluster Size Cluster Maxima (MNI) Z Score
Negatively Correlated with Sense of Agency: ns
Negatively Correlated with Sense of Performance
R&L Medial precuneus, posterior
cingulate cortex
402 −10 −42 8 3.45
−6 −48 16 3.39
2 −42 14 3.13
Positively Correlated with Sense of Agency
R Putamen, thalamus 566 24 −28 10 3.89
14 −12 12 3.81
28 0 4 3.74
R&L Rostral cingulate zone,
pre-SMA
634 2 −2 40 3.25
8 18 48 3.17
2 26 50 3.10
R Pre/postcentral gyrus 301 48 −26 46 3.71
40 −20 54 3.63
44 −12 64 3.23
R Calcarine, precuneus 252 6 −62 14 4.11
10 −68 28 4.36
14 −60 26 2.98
Positively Correlated with Sense of Performance: ns
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posterior parietal cortex plays a causal role in detecting un-
expected outcomes of self-generated movements. These
and other findings provide converging evidence that in-
creased TPJ activity may be associated with detecting mis-
matches between forward estimates and sensory feedback.
However, the possibility that TPJ activity is also associated
with executing motor corrections cannot be entirely ruled
out. Although a number of previous agency studies showed
that TPJ activation was present during monitoring when
control was held constant (e.g., when participants merely
observed disruptions of control and were not given the
opportunity to perform corrective actions; e.g., Spengler
et al., 2009), none of these studies attempted to determine
whether this TPJ activity was absent during control when
monitoring was held constant. Furthermore, because the
gamephase of each trial in the present experiment involved
a continuous stream of disruptions and corrective move-
ments, our study is also unable to distinguish between
these two interpretations of the observed TPJ activity.
Being in Control
Although previous agency studies (e.g., Tsakiris et al.,
2010; Farrer et al., 2003) have occasionally identified pat-
terns of brain activity that are associated with increases in
control, these patterns have not been consistent across
studies—suggesting, perhaps, that feeling in control is
really just the absence of feeling out of control (Hohwy,
2007). However, the lack of a consistent neural signature
for “being in control” might have been due to the fact that
prior studies did not control for variation in task perfor-
mance (which tends to be strongly correlated with per-
ceived agency). The results of the parametric analysis we
conducted, which did control for task performance, yielded
significant clusters of activation in the right putamen/
thalamus, bilateral rostral cingulate zone/pre-SMA, right
pre/postcentral gyrus, and right calcarine/precuneus (see
David et al., 2007, for a similar pattern of results). It is of in-
terest and, perhaps, even intuitive that these are the same
regions that have been indentified in studies of smoothly
executed, self-initiated actions (Boecker, Jankowski, Ditter, &
Scheef, 2008; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Walton,
Devlin, & Rushworth, 2004; Cunnington, Windischberger,
Deecke, & Moser, 2002; see Nachev, Kennard, & Husain,
2008, for a review).
Metacognitive Judgments of Agency:
Self-reflective Processing
The primary new finding of the present study is that the
left aPFC and right OFC increased in activation when par-
ticipants made judgments of agency compared with
when they made judgments of performance. Prior re-
search on self-attribution and self-reflection indicates that
these areas are part of cortical midline structures that
subserve self-reflective processing. According to recent
meta-analyses and theoretical reviews of published fMRI
and PET studies on self-reflection, these structures can
be segregated into several functionally distinct regions
(van der Meer et al., 2010; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007;
Northoff et al., 2006). The most ventral region, which in-
cludes portions of the aPFC, OFC, and the pACC, receives
projections from a number of sensory and emotional pro-
cessing centers such as the limbic system and the striatum
(Ongur & Price, 2000) and, thus, is thought to be involved
in the appraisal of sensory and affective stimuli in terms of
their self-relevance (Ochsner et al., 2004; Zysset, Huber,
Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002; see Amodio & Frith, 2006,
for a review). The more dorsal midline structures,2 includ-
ing the dorsomedial PFC (dMPFC), are tightly connected
to areas of the lateral PFC that are involved in high-level
reasoning and decision-making and, therefore, are be-
lieved to underlie the conscious formation of inferences
and judgments based on information that may have been
tagged as self-relevant (or not) by the aPFC/OFC. Finally,
the posterior midline structures are considered part of a
hippocampal network that is implicated in the encoding
and retrieval of autobiographical memories and, thus, are
thought to be responsible for putting self-relevant infor-
mation within a temporal context that is informed by prior
experience. The location of the brain activity observed for
judgments of agency compared with judgments of perfor-
mance suggests that judgments of agency may involve more
self-related sensory-affective processing comparedwith other
types of metacognitive judgments. This is consistent with a
number of theories of agency (e.g., Haggard& Tsakiris, 2009;
Synofzik et al., 2008; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007).
An alternative explanation for the present results could
be that activity in the aPFC/OFC reflects a more general
process of evaluating information about individuals, re-
gardless of whether or not the information pertains to
the self (see Amodio & Frith, 2006). Although a number
of studies have shown that inferences about other peopleʼs
mental states and personality traits are typically associated
with activity in the dMPFC, some of these studies have
shown that such non-self-related inferences occasionally
activate the aPFC/OFC as well (see Mitchell, Macrae, &
Banaji, 2006, for a review). It is, however, important to note
that in many of the studies that reported aPFC/OFC activa-
tion, participants were asked to mentalize about friends
and similar others as opposed to strangers. A recent study
(Mitchell et al., 2006) that specifically examined this distinc-
tion suggests that mentalizing about close or similar others
is informed by knowledge about oneʼs own thoughts and
feelings, which implies that the medial aPFC/OFC is indeed
dedicated to processing self-relevant information. Addi-
tional support for this conclusion comes from a recent
meta-analysis of studies in which judgments about the self
were contrasted with judgments about others (van der
Meer et al., 2010), which showed that activity in the
aPFC/OFC is more strongly associated with judgments
about the self.
Finally, a study by Powell, Macrae, Cloutier, Metcalfe, and
Mitchell (2009) seems, at first glance, to be inconsistent
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with the present results. Participants in this study com-
pleted a self-reflection task, in which they judged their
own or another personʼs personality traits, as well as
an agency task in which they freely chose words to study
or watched passively as words were selected for them by
the computer. Although the results showed increased
activation in the aPFC when participants judged their
own traits as opposed to anotherʼs, no ventral activity
was found when they actively chose words to study
(compared with when the computer chose for them). In-
stead, freely choosing words was associated with in-
creased activity in the intraparietal sulcus. However,
because choosing is quite different from retrospectively
assessing how much control one had (i.e., it is an act and
not a reflection), the fact that the choice task was not as-
sociated with aPFC/OFC activity may actually be con-
sistent with the present findings. In fact, considering
that the intraparietal sulcus overlaps with the TPJ, it
appears that making voluntary choices may have more
to do with action and action monitoring than with meta-
cognition of agency.
Conclusion
Although a number of studies have attempted to identify
the brain regions that underlie the on-line monitoring of
action, ours is the first to dissociate such low-level action
monitoring from metacognitive assessments of agency.
Although the results presented here were consistent with
previous results on action monitoring, it is not action
monitoring, but rather metacognition of agency, that is
implicated in the attributions that underlie our feelings
of responsibility for our own actions. The neural under-
pinnings of these metacognitions of agency have not
been previously demonstrated. We found—by contrast-
ing the neural activity associated with judging agency to
the activity associated with a different type of metacogni-
tive judgment (i.e., judging performance)—that there is a
specific area (an area distinct from the regions involved in
action monitoring and related instead to self-referential
processing) that is central to peopleʼs conscious, retro-
spective judgments of their own agency.
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Notes
1. We excluded five studies (see Table 1) that were originally
included in the meta-analysis by Decety and Lamm (2007) be-
cause they did not fit with our definition of agency (e.g., we did
not include studies that involved perceiving agency in the ac-
tions of others). In addition, we included activation peaks from
the left side of the brain, whereas Decety and Lamm did not,
because most of the studies included in the meta-analysis re-
ported bilateral TPJ activation.
2. Because the boundary between the ventral and dMPFC is
not strictly defined, it is worth noting that we use the term
“dorsal” to refer to areas that are above a z coordinate of 20,
which roughly corresponds to BA 9. This usage is in keeping
with cited reviews of self-reflective processing.
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